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Abstract— This paper analyses the Colombian household utilities demand using the exact affine Stone index demand system to estimate
the price and expenditure elasticities. We use this framework to analyzed the welfare implications of a new tax on electricity demand of
households in strata 4, 5 and 6 implemented to safe from drastic electricity disruptions the northwestern Colombian region. So, we propose
a new progressive tax rule that minimizes welfare losses while maintaining the target of average tax revenues.
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Resumen— Este documento analiza la demanda de servicios públicos de los hogares colombianos utilizando el sistema de demanda exact
affine Stone index para estimar las elasticidades precio y gasto. Utilizamos este marco para analizar las implicaciones de bienestar de un
nuevo impuesto sobre la demanda de electricidad de los hogares en los estratos 4, 5 y 6 implementado para evitar drásticas interrupciones
de la electricidad en la región noroeste de Colombia. Finalmente, proponemos un esquema progresivo alternativo de impuestos tal que se
minimicen las pérdidas de bienestar manteniendo el objetivo de ingresos fiscales requeridos.




Access to energy services is considered a prerequisite for
human and economic development in modern society (Mo-
di et al., 2006). Energy supply is an essential factor in peo-
ple’s quality of life after water and air. In general, energy is
necessary for the provision of services by the State, for use
in production for the different economic sectors (Martínez,
2009), and domestic activities in households, making it a di-
rect source of welfare for them (Medina and Morales, 2007;
Ramírez and Londoño, 2008).
In Colombia, final energy consumption increased by 47%
between 1990 to 2018, wherein this last year the residential
sector had a 20% share with an energy demand of 260 Peta-
joules (UPME, 2019). Figure 1 characterizes the most used
energies in the residential sector and its use, it is noted that
the use of electricity is more diversified than other sources. In
general, households use electricity for refrigeration, lighting,
and television.
The demand for electricity has been growing in Colombia,
according to XM, the administrator of the Colombian who-
lesale energy market, it is expected that for the period 2019
to 2033, the National Interconnected System (SIN) demand
will grow 2.29% annually on average.
FIG. 1: ENERGY USE OF RESIDENTIAL SECTOR IN PETAJOULES
Source: Own Elaboration based on plan energético nacional 2020-2050
(UPME, 2019)
From the supply side, Colombia’s energy matrix has been
transformed. In 2018, the capacity of the SIN was composed
of the hydraulic generation with a share of 68%, about 31%
to thermal generation (13.3% with natural gas, 7.8% with li-
quid fuels and 9.5% with coal) and 1% to non-conventional
renewable energy sources (NCRE): wind, solar, and biomass.
These results reflect price policies oriented to decrease par-
ticipation of diesel, and coverage policies geared to increase
electric energy and gas.
Nowadays, one of the significant challenges is to integra-
te NCRE sources due to having variable costs close to ze-
ro and reducing risks in drought scenarios. Therefore, an
institutional and regulatory framework that allows incorpo-
rating distributed energy resources and makes better use of
technological advances is fundamental. It is expected that by
2031, NCRE sources will have participation between 13%
and 18% of the Colombian electricity generation. For ins-
tance, Germany accounted for 36% of gross electricity con-
sumption from renewable sources in 2018. Currently, the Mi-
nistry of Mines and Energy is working on the mission state-
ment for energy transformation that includes a road map for
these challenges.
Although electricity coverage index has increased by 20%
over the past twenty years, reaching 97.02% in 2016, this
still represents that nearly 2 million Colombians do not have
this service, according to the Ministry of Mines and Energy.
This reflects challenges in outreaching and servicing electri-
city despite the efforts that the government has been making
with the Plan Indicativo de Expansión de Cobertura de Ener-
gía Eléctrica (PIEC).
We can see from Figure 1 that uses such as food refrige-
ration and lighting are essential for proper nutrition and opti-
mal task performance. To ensure access to service, residential
users from strata 1, 2, and 3 obtain a subsidy on the tariff ap-
plicable to subsistence consumption. The level of subsistence
depends on whether the height of the municipality is above a
threshold measured in meters above sea level, due to clima-
tic conditions that affecting electricity consumption. On the
other hand, households in strata 5 and 6 make contributions.
These asymmetries in payment are reflected in prices (See
Figure 2). Regarding expenditure, it seems that the demand
factor associated implicitly with income levels (i.e. stratum)
implies non-linear Engel curves. This has been recently re-
cognized in demand system literature (Blundell et al., 2007).
To analyze the Colombian household utility demand for
strata 4, 5 and 6, we specify a non-linear demand system
composed of electricity, gas, water, and sewerage. This ap-
proach allows to have estimates of own-price and cross-
price elasticities, analyze heterogeneous socio-demographic
effects on demand, and make welfare calculations. The latter
helps to analyze welfare implications of taxes. In particular,
we use the equivalent variation to analyze the impact of an
exogenous tax on electricity demand from households in stra-
ta 4, 5 and 6 that was proposed in the National Development
Plan (PND, 2018) to avoid drastic electricity disruptions in
the northwestern Colombian region.
This new tax is a flat tariff per kilowatt overall households.
However, the microeconomic theory foundation suggests that
welfare losses can be reduced if a progressive tax program on
consumption is implemented. Therefore, we propose a new
progressive taxation rule minimizing welfare losses but kee-
ping average tax revenues under the baseline scenario (re-
gressive tax rule).
This paper aims to contribute in two fronts: a rigorous
analysis of the Colombian utility demand of strata 4, 5 and 6,
and a welfare analysis due to a tax on electricity. To achieve
these aims, we estimate an exact affine stone index (EASI)
demand system proposed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2009).
This approach allows us to take into account endogeneity
between prices and budget shares, non-linearities in the ag-
gregated price index and generate polynomial Engel curves.
Additionally, price matrix with rank greater than two, and
error terms that can be interpreted as unobserved preference
heterogeneity. These features are not present in conventional
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demand systems like the almost ideal demand system (Dea-
ton and Muellbauer, 1980a) and its quadratic version (Blun-
dell and Robin, 1999).
The paper is structured in six sections, including this intro-
duction. Section 2 briefly describes the Colombian electricity
market paying attention to the northwestern region. Section 3
presents the literature review. Section 4 shows the theoretical
framework emphasizing in the EASI demand system. Sec-
tion 5 shows estimation results and welfare analysis. Finally,
we conclude this paper with a summary of the main findings
and some policy recommendations.
2. THE COLOMBIAN ELECTRICITY MARKET
Agents in the Colombian energy market are responsible
for producing, carrying, and selling energy to the end-user.
They are classified into generators, transmitters, distributors,
marketers, and one administrator, according to the role they
play.












































Own Elaboration, Source: Sistema Úncio de Información (SUI)
The Colombian energy market has both regulated and un-
regulated segments. The regulated market, is directly con-
tracted and served by distribution companies, encompasses
industrial, commercial, and residential users with energy de-
mands of less than 55 MWh-month. In this market, the tariff
structure is established by the regulatory agency Comisión de
Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG). Figure 2 shows ave-
rage prices charged by the top ten energy companies to hou-
seholds differentiating by strata for the year 2017, the date
on which the household survey used in this paper was com-
pleted. It can be seen that there is heterogeneity in the tariff
charged to residential users.
On the other hand, users with high energy consumption
participate voluntarily in the Non-Regulated Market. An un-
regulated user is a consumer with energy demands greater
than or equal to 55 MWh-month. Unlike the regulated one,
the commercialization and generation price is freely agreed
through a negotiation process between consumers and retai-
lers.
In 2019, approximately 100 agents were dedicated to com-
mercial activities of electricity in Colombia. Of these compa-
nies, Electricaribe is one of the largest companies providing
regulated electricity service to about 2.7 million users on the
Caribbean coast (northwestern Colombian region). In 2018
of the total national residential consumption (kWh), Electri-
caribe attended about one third of total users. Also, Electri-
caribe subscribers are mostly from lower strata, 60% from
stratum 1, and 24% from stratum 2 (SUI, 2019). The above
shows not only the relevance of this company in terms of the
amount of demand it covers nationally, but also the type of
users it serves. Figure 3 shows the consumption and the num-
ber of household users served by Electricaribe at a national
level in 2019.
Given technical and financial problems that this company
has presented, the Government, through the Superintenden-
cia de Servicios Publicos Domiciliarios (SSPD), has been
taking measures to ensure continuity of service to users. In
November 2016 Electricaribe was intervened by the SSPD,
to mitigate the financial crisis of the company, and the risk of
suffering electricity disruptions. In particular, the National
Development Plan 2018-2022, “Pacto por Colombia, pacto
por la equidad", the Government’s road map for a 4 years
period came into effect. Articles 312 - 318 aims to face Elec-
tricaribe crisis from the following fronts; first, the Govern-
ment will take care of the Electricaribe worker’s pensions.
Second, there will be a new tariff regime to ensure efficient
electricity service in Electricaribe’s market, and finally, Co-
lombian electricity consumers classified in strata 4, 5 and 6,
and non-residential will have to pay a tax of COP/kWh $4 or
USD 0,12 ¢/kWh.
FIG. 3: Electricaribe MARKET
Own Elaboration, Source: Sistema Úncio de Información (SUI)
This paper focuses on the latter measure, which came into
effect on July 1, 2019. It will be adopted until December 31,
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2022, seeking annual revenues of approximately $160 billion
to support financing, obligations, investments, and continuity
of service.
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
In general, literature dedicated to the analysis of household
utility demand is composed of a large amount of papers
mainly motivated by topics like changes in fuel prices, effi-
cient use, taxation, substitution between electricity and other
energy, and reduction of gas emissions. In particular, residen-
tial energy demand has a different salient point according to
Kriström (2009); generally quite price-inelastic but a respon-
se to income, variations due to non-price related factors such
as; demographic factors (life-cycle and ethnic groups), host
of exogenous factors, (i.e., temperature) and attitudes such
as "feelings of obligation", ïmportance of conservation"have
been found to correlate with energy conservation behavior.
The study of energy demand constitutes a vast literatu-
re, even when restricting the analysis to the residential sec-
tor. Many authors study the residential electricity demand
using aggregated data, i.e., Donatos and Mergos (1991); Lin
(2003); Narayan and Smyth (2008); Dergiades and Tsoulfidis
(2008); Alberini and Filippini (2011). However, studies using
macroeconomic data suffer information loss since they can-
not account for specific, individual determinants of energy
use, this often impedes a more disaggregated analysis. This
proposal belongs to the literature studying the micro determi-
nants of energy demand using microeconomic data such that
we represent the household’s behavior more closely. The fo-
llowing literature review is framed in this context.
For a group of countries, Lee and Chiu (2011) and Krish-
namurthy and Kriström (2015) study residential electricity
demand in OECD countries. The previous work shows the
nonlinear link between electricity consumption, real income,
electricity price, and temperature. They show that electricity
demand is less sensitive to changes in its price. When real
income rises, electricity consumption rapidly increases, and
evidence of a U-shaped relationship between electricity con-
sumption and the temperature is supported. The latter paper
provides evidence about strong price responsiveness, weak
income responsiveness, and presence of non-price related
factors, showing the importance of taking into account the
heterogeneity of households and non-linearity in energy de-
mand.
Most studies in this field perform the analysis for a spe-
cific country and obtain different results according to met-
hodology, covered period, data or motivation. For the Uni-
ted Kingdom, Baker et al. (1989) emphasizes the variation
of the elasticities across the types of households, the theo-
retical budgeting model of the allocation of household ex-
penditures. Blundell and Robin (1999) apply ILLE in two
residential demand systems concluding that the distribution
of price elasticities of QUAIDS model is more dispersed due
to the presence of a quadratic term in expenditure. Meanwhi-
le, Jones and Lomas (2015) focuses on relevant socioecono-
mic and dwelling characteristics determining high electricity
demand. Labandeira et al. (2006) study Spanish residential
spending on different goods, including electricity through a
QUAIDS model. Among their results, it is worth mentioning
that electricity is the most elastic in contrast to the price of
natural gas, recall that electricity is a normal good, and con-
clude that household composition also affects energy expen-
diture. Labandeira et al. (2012) calculates the elasticity bet-
ween households and companies finding a more price inelas-
tic energy demand by households. They show that elasticity
diminishes as the level of per-capita income increases. For
Germany, Schulte and Heindl (2017) and Reaños and Wöl-
fing (2018), the latter uses the EASI methodology; they dis-
cover differences own-price elasticities between the effects
of energy price changes on lower-income households compa-
red to richer ones, the first ones suggesting stronger reactivity
to price changes.
For other European countries, see Nesbakken (2001) and
Halvorsen and Larsen (2001) for Norway. For Asian coun-
tries Shi and Song (2012) for China, Yoo et al. (2007) for Ko-
rea and Filippini (2004) and Gundimeda and Köhlin (2008)
for India. Among papers that study residential electricity de-
mand in the USA stand out Silk and Joutz (1997), who esti-
mate an error correction model. Lavín et al. (2011) and Woo
et al. (2018) study residential electricity and gas demand,
they highlight that households have inelastic price elasticities
of electricity and natural gas demand in the short and long
term. In Latinamerica Chang and Martinez-Chombo (2003)
for Mexico, Schmidt and Lima (2004); Uhr et al. (2019) for
Brazil, Garcia and Alvarado (2018) for Peru and González
et al. (2012) for Chile are some other studies. Interesting a
Metadata analysis by Espey and Espey (2004) and Labandei-
ra et al. (2016) about different products of energy.
Finally, in Colombia, different works such as Barrien-
tos et al. (2012); Barrientos and Martínez (2017), and Gil-
Vera (2017), have focused on forecasting energy demand.
Among the papers that have been focused on the calcula-
tion of household elasticity are; Medina and Morales (2007)
and Pinzón (2010) who methodologically use discrete conti-
nuous and block price estimation respectively, show a non-
uniform distribution of the price elasticity of electricity in
households. Maddock et al. (1992) estimates the demand for
electricity in Medellin, finding different elasticities per stra-
tum. Cano et al. (2011) examines Colombian’s expenditure in
daily need, including electricity consumption, they find that it
is a normal good but inelastic to expenses, in line with Acuña
and Forero (2013), who claim that energy for domestic use is
a necessary commodity.
In general, when faced with changes in the electricity ta-
riff, users reduce their energy consumption (Zapata, 2011)
or the consumption of other goods to guarantee subsistence
consumption (Medina and Morales, 2007; Ramírez and Lon-
doño, 2008), as it is considered an essential utility with a few
substitutes (Mendoza, 2010).
Price and income demand elasticities for electricity of the
papers mentioned above are reported in Table 1. About resi-
dential water consumption, the article by Arbués et al. (2003)
presents a review of the literature on this topic and Labandei-
ra et al. (2016) about natural gas.
Concerning the second topic of interest, welfare analysis,
Chipman and Moore (1980) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995)
showed that Equivalent Variation (EV) is generally the re-
levant measure for performing welfare analysis in a context
in which different tariff policies are ordered. The EV is the
amount of money the consumer receives, leaving it indiffe-
rent from accepting the change in price, i.e., the change in
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TABLE 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
Authors Country Methodology Own-PriceElasticity
Own-Income
Elasticity
Baker et al. (1989)
Great Britain
1972-1983 Two-Stage -0.75 0.13







Silk & Joutz (1997)
US
1949-1993 Error Correction LR: -0.5 LR: 0.5
Blundell & Robin (1999)
UK
1974-1993 ILLE - QUAIDS -0.75 0.13
Nesbakken (2001)
Norway
1971-1990 Discrete-continuous SR: -0.55 SR: 0.13




LR: -0.44 0.06 to 0.13




Cointegrated LR: -0.44 LR: 1.95
Lin (2003)
China
1985-2001 VECM LR: 0.8




Approach –0.29 to -0.51 0.60 to 0.64
Schmidt & Lima (2004)
Brazil
1980-2000 Error Correction -0.15 1.10
Labandeira et al. (2006)
Spain
1985-1995 QUAIDS -0.79 0.53 to 1.01
Medina & Morales (2007)
Colombia
2003 Discrete-continuous -0.48 0,32
Yoo (2007)
Korea
2005 Bivariate/ Univariate -0.24 0.06
Dergiades & Tsoulfidis (2008)
US
1965-2006 ARDL LR: -1.06 LR: 0.28
Gundimeda & Köhlin (2008)
India
2008 LA-AIDS -0.91 to -0.59 0.53 to 0.89
Pinzón (2010)
Colombia
2006-2010 Block Prices -0.57 to 2.8





SR: -0.08 to -0.15
LR: -0.45 to -0.75
Ramírez et al. (2011)
Colombia
1968-2007 AIDS -0.37 0.96








Gonzáles et al. (2012)
Chile
2006 Non-linear LS –0.43 to –0.36 0,11
Labandeira et al. (2012)
Spain
2005-2007 Panel RE -0.25
Lavin & Hanemann (2011)
US
1993-1997 Discrete-continuous -0.72 to -0.28 0.14
Shi et al. (2012)
China
2008-2009 Pooled -2.47 0.05













Heckman (1979) -0.13 to -0.14 0.23 to 0.39
Krishnamurthy & Kriström (2015) 11 OECD -0.27 to -1.4 0.07 to 0.16
Galves et al. (2016)
Spain
2012 QUAIDS -0.86 0,10
Schulte & Heindl (2017)
Germany
1993-2008 QUAIDS -0.43 0.25 to 0.44
Garcia & Alvarado (2018)
Peru
2004-2014 AIDS - QUAIDS -3.80 to -3.69 0.73
Tovar & Wölfing (2018)
Germany






Uhr et al. (2019)
Brazil
1998-2013 Quantile Regression -0.46 to -0.56 0.20 to 0.32
wealth equivalent to the change in price in terms of its im-
pact on welfare.
Previous intends to perform a welfare analysis may be ba-
sed on simulating a cost-of-living associated with a change
of price (i.e., a tax) for a particular good. Banks et al. (1997)
for the United Kingdom , Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) for
Canada, and particularly for the change of price electricity,
Medina and Morales (2007); Ramírez and Londoño (2008)
for Colombia, Hanemann et al. (2013) for Spain, Schulte and
Heindl (2017) and Reaños and Wölfing (2018) for Germany
and Uhr et al. (2019) for Brazil.
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4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The response of consumers to changes in prices of goods is
instrumental for any ex-ante assessment of the welfare con-
sequences of taxation. Demand models play an essential role
in assessing changes in tax policies. In particular, the analy-
sis of taxes on commodities, such as energy, requires precise
specification of both price and revenue effects. In Colom-
bia, for instance, Medina and Morales (2007) show that due
to the inelasticity of demand for domestic services such as
water and electricity, policies that affect their prices can sig-
nificantly impact the welfare of the population.
Standard demand models did not provide an accurate ad-
justment of the behavior observed in all income groups due
to analysis with aggregated variables or estimates of demand
that take an average tariff for the household, even when the
analysis has been done at the micro-level. Different works
on consumer spending have found Engel curves that exhi-
bit linear or quadratic behavior, while others are S-shaped
(Blundell et al., 2007).
Typical parametric demand models cannot cover this va-
riety of shapes and are limited by Gorman’s type range res-
trictions. Gorman (1981) proved that for any exactly aggre-
gable demand system with Marshallian form demands that
are derived from utility maximization, the maximum possi-
ble rank of the matrix is three. Generalizing Gorman, Lew-
bel (1991) defined the rank of any demand system to be the
dimension of the space spanned by its Engel curves. They
show that the maximum possible rank of any demand system
corresponding to any cost function is the number of goods in
the system minus one. Finally, in most empirical demand mo-
dels, the error term in the models cannot be interpreted as a
random utility parameter representing unobserved consumer
heterogeneity (Brown and Walker, 1989; Lewbel, 2001).
EASI claims overcome these two limitations; demands are
not constrained to have rank less than three, and the error
term allows for an interpretation such as the unobserved hete-
rogeneity of preferences in demand systems. Work with data
at the micro-level, allowing the calculation of elasticities to
vary according to household characteristics and allows error
terms equal random utility parameters to account for unob-
served preference heterogeneity. The above becomes vital
given that if a consumer has a high unobserved preference
parameter for good, he/she will allocate a large part of the
budget. So, in the face of a price increase, this agent will be
more affected than another, which links the income effect to
the unobserved preference heterogeneity.
Following Fisher et al. (2001) demand systems can be
classified into; locally flexible (i.e. Leontief (Diewert, 1971),
Translog, (Christensen et al., 1975), Almost Ideal Demand
System (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a)), globally regular;
Laurent system, (Barnett, 1983, 1985) and Quadratic Almost
Ideal System, QUAIDS, (Banks et al., 1997) and globally
flexible functional forms. These specifications have allowed
multiple empirical applications and still forms the backbone
of many empirical analyses in different fields. However, the-
re are certain limitations due to non-fulfillment of properties
of the economic theory, range restrictions, or inflexibility in
some of these models.
Many of the above models use for the specification of the
demand system the dual approach, which is an advantage be-
cause it allows the empirical generation of functional forms
for Engel curves without the need to assume a specific fun-
ctional form for the utility function. This procedure consists
in minimizing the expenditure needed to reach a certain level
of utility. In this way, all the information of the utility fun-
ction that is relevant for the empirical analysis is contained in
the cost function, empirical nesting information with econo-
mic theory (see McFadden, 1978; Diewert, 1971, for a formal
demonstration). Additionally, It can be shown (Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980b) that Marshallian and Hicksian demand
satisfy integrability properties, the value of the Marshallian
and Hicksian demands is the total expenditure, and homoge-
neity, of zero degrees at prices and income. Hicksian demand
presents symmetry properties, which guarantees consistency
in consumer choice, and negativity reflected in the Slutsky
matrix, which in economic terms means that demand for a
good decreases (or at least remains constant) while increa-
ses its price. The EASI model follows the idea of the dual
approach.
The choice of the demand model entirely determines the
specification of income effects. In that sense, the AIDS de-
mand system allows goods to be luxuries or necessities by
accommodating Engel curves that are linearly increasing or
decreasing. The QUAIDS model goes one step further by
also accommodating quadratic relationships, and the EASI
model allows higher degree polynomial Engel curves.
4.1. The EASI demand system
The EASI model is one of the most significant recent ad-
vancements in the toolbox of demand system estimation. It
allows any polynomial shape of Engel curves, and the esti-
mated error terms can be interpreted as random utility para-
meters accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity.
The EASI system can be estimated, based on expenditure and
price data alone. No actual quantities are necessary. For mo-
re details, please refer to Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) and
Pendakur (2009).
The methodology seeks to construct expenditure functions
that have simple expressions for utility u in terms of obser-
vable variables,w, p, z and x, budget shares, log prices, so-
cioeconomic variables and log nominal expenditure, respec-
tively. Given the implicit utility, y, and substituting y for u in
the Hicksian demands obtains what we call implicit Marsha-
llian demand functions. The expressions for the system are
given by Equations (1) and (2).




The log nominal total expenditures x that faces the J-vector
of log prices p, assume that chooses a bundle of goods, des-
cribed by the J-vector of budget shares w, to maximize linear
utility budget constrain. Finally, z are the characteristics of
the household, B and A are J× J symmetric matrices. y has
many of the properties of log real expenditures. It equals a
cardinalization of utility u, it is affine in nominal expenditu-
res x, and it equals x in the base period when all prices equal
one (which is when log prices p equal zero). Also, when B is
zero, y exactly equals the log of nominal expenditures defla-
ted by the Stone price index.
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So, the construction of the cost function allows us to ha-
ve the following interpretation, the log cost or expenditure
function is x = C(p,u,z,ε) which equals the minimum log-
expenditure required for an individual with characteristics z,
to attain utility level u when facing log price p. By Shep-











where br is the Engel curve terms, r= 0,1,2...,5 specify bud-
get shares as fifth-order polynomials in y. The terms C and
D allow demographic characteristics to enter into budget sha-
res through both intercept and slope terms on y. So, to ma-
ke explicit the heterogeneous nature of preferences, obser-
vable and unobservable sources, is included an L-vector of
observable demographic characteristics that affect preferen-
ces z=(z1,z2...zL)′ and a J-vector of unobserved preference
characteristics satisfying 1′Jε=0. Finally, compensated price
effects governed by Al and B.
Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) shows under which condi-
tions both random utility parameters and arbitrarily compli-
cated Engel curves can be estimated. Finally, although y is
endogenous (it depends on w), it can be instrumented (for
example, by x and p). The intuition is that given the unob-
served implicit utility y, the estimation can take the form of
instrumental variables, using iterative linear three-stage least
squares method (3SLS). The approach to estimating the EA-
SI demand model impose additivity, homogeneity, and sym-
metry. The resulting EASI demand functions have the follo-
wing properties:
EASI budget share demand functions are, apart from
the construction of y, completely linear in parameters,
which facilitates estimation in models with many goods.
EASI budget shares are linear in p and are polynomials
of any order in z and y. They can also include interaction
terms such as py, zy and pz , and contain other functions
of z and y.
Define semielasticities to be derivatives of budget shares w
with respect to log prices p, implicit utility y, log nominal to-
tal expenditures x, and demographic characteristics (or other
observed taste drivers) z. The semielasticity of a budget share
can be converted into an ordinary elasticity of budget share
by dividing by that budget share. We provide semielastici-
ties because they are easier to present algebraically. Hicksian






Semielasticities with respect to y, which can vary quite a







Demographic semielasticities are given by:
∇zw(p,z,y,ε) = cl +dly+Alp. (5)
Cost functions with y, given by equation (1), have Mars-









Solving for the Marshallian semielasticity with respect to









Marshallian price elasticitie are recovered from Hicksian -
p elasticities (equation (3)) and the above Marshallian x elas-
ticities using the Slutsky matrix.
∇pw(p,x,z,ε) =
∇pw(p,z,u,ε)− (∇xw(p,x,z,ε))w(p,z,y,ε). (8)
Equations 7 and 8 allow to obtain Marshallian expenditure










We now show how to evaluate the effects of changing
prices or other variables in EASI models, and we consider
evaluating the cost to an individual of a price change. The
estimated parameters from the demand system can be used
to compute a metric for the maximum amount a consumer
would be prepared to pay at the budget level x to avoid the
change from p0 to p1, the superscripts 0 and 1 denote prices
p before and after price change.
C(p1,u,z,ε)−C(p0,u,z,ε). (11)
This measure is called equivalent variation (EV), and fo-
llowing Reaños and Wölfing (2018):




























From the Encuesta Nacional de Presupuesto de los Ho-
gares (ENPH) - 2016, carried out by the Colombian natio-
nal institute of statistics (DANE) between July 2016 - June
2017, households in strata 4, 5, and 6 were selected, which
are those affected by the tax policy. So, from a total of 87,201
households, a sample of 5,838 is used. Each household was
characterized as follows: gender and age of household head,
highest level of education attained by any household mem-
ber, number of people living in the household, and socio-
economic score of household (strata from 1 to 6, low-low
to high-high). Current expenditure is composed of monetary
and non-monetary spending, meanwhile total expenditure by
current and capital expenditure. Current and total income, as
well as total expenditure on utilities (electricity, water, sewe-
rage and gas) is also taken from this survey.
Equation 13 shows expenditure (Euismt ) on utility u at hou-














so this expenditure is equal to payment for variable con-
sumption (V ) plus fixed cost (F). The former is equal to price
at consumption range r times consumption in this range.
Electricity consumption does not have fixed cost, that is,
Fusmt = 0, and subsidies on consumption tariff ($kWh) de-
pends on consumption ranges, which are given by subsis-
tence consumption and municipality location above sea level
(m.a.s.l). However, these details apply to strata 1, 2 and 3, as
a consequence, it is not necessary to take them into account in
our application. So, tariff depends just on stratum and elec-
tricity provider due to being a flat tariff. We use household
municipality location to identify the most relevant provider
in this area, and use to impute price.
Gas consumption does not have explicitly fixed costs for
strata 4, 5 and 6, and and there is not particular discrimination
associated with m.s.a.l. We used same tariff imputation stra-
tegy as electricity. This information is available at Sistema
Único de Información (SUI, www.sui.gov.co) and Comisión
de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG, www.creg.gov.co).
On the other hand, water and sewerage have fixed charges
which depends on regulated providers and strata. This infor-
mation is available at Sistema Único de Información (SUI).
Therefore, we obtain variable expenditure on water and se-
werage subtracting fixed charges from total expenditure. We
calculate variable utility expenditure shares, which are our
dependent variables, as these are directly under household’s
control.
Water and sewerage average tariff per cubic meter depend
also on m.a.s.l and household consumption level (basic, com-
plementary and luxury). Resolution Comisión de Regulación
de Agua, CRA 750 de 2016 defines consumption ranges to
classify consumption as basic, complementary and luxury
depending on m.a.s.l. The first range is for municipalities
with an average altitude below 1,000 m.a.s.l., the second for
municipalities with an average altitude between 1,000 and
2,000 m.a.s.l., and finally the last range for municipalities
with average altitude above 2,000 meters. A municipality in
a lower range can consume more cubic meters (m3) at lower
consumption prices; so, prices associated with basic water
consumption is up to 16 m3, 13 m3 and 11 m3 for munici-
palities in first, second and third m.a.s.l level, respectively.
Prices at complementary level is between upper basic ranges
and 32m3, 26m3, and 22m3, respectively, and luxury prices
apply to additional consumption.
We can deduce average water and sewerage tariff per
using variable expenditure on these utilities, municipality lo-
cation and strata from ENPH survey, consumption ranges
from CRA, and provider marginal prices from SUI in con-
junction with equation 13. Observe that average prices are
weighted averages of marginal prices.
Due to households were surveyed in different months bet-
ween 2016 and 2017, prices are expressed at June 2017 va-
lues. Then, all prices, expenditures, and fixed charges are ex-
pressed in dollars, as shown in Table 2 at the exchange rate
of June 30, 2017, the month in which the survey ended.
5.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of household expen-
diture shares. We report proportion of zeros in the sample,
where water has the lowest figure (3%), while sewerage has
the highest (43%). It can be also seen that, on average, elec-
tricity share is the greatest (55%, followed by water (27%).1
Electricity has an average cost per unit of 0.17 USD/kWh.
During the analysis period, Cartagena was the city with the
lowest cost of the service 0.13 USD/kWh, while Montería
had the highest at 0.27 USD/kWh. Sincelejo the city that has
the highest charge per unit in water service, where average
tariff is 0.67 . Natural gas average price is 0.50 , with Yo-
pal and Neiva being the cities that paid a cheaper and higher
price per unit of consumption, respectively.
TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Zero Shares
Shares
Electricity 0.55 0.21 0.05
Water 0.27 0.21 0.03
Sewerage 0.06 0.09 0.43
Natural Gas 0.11 0.11 0.18
Prices Min Max
Electricity(USD/kWh) 0.17 0.02 0.13 0.27
(Cartagena) (Montería)
Water (USD/m3 ) 0.67 0.25 0.16 1.46
(Valledupar) (Sincelejo)
Sewerage(USD/m3) 0.57 0.24 0.16 1.31
(Valledupar) (Bogotá)
Natural Gas(USD/m3) 0.50 0.12 0.09 0.95
(Yopal) (Neiva)
Prices are converted to dollars using the exchange rate of 30/06/2017, equivalent to 1 USD =$3,038.26. Source: Su-
perintendencia Financiera de Colombia
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the hou-
seholds. Demographic variables were chosen according to
literature review mentioned in Section 3 and data availabi-
lity. Likewise, the expenditure in dollars is shown, which is
in line with the descriptive statistics of the expenditure shares
mentioned in the previous table.
On average, the head of household is a person over 50
years old; however, there is a heterogeneity of households
according to the dispersion presented by this variable. As for
the participation of women as head of household, they repre-
1We omit shares equal to 0 for the latter figures to avoid distortions.
8
sent 40%. On average, the size of the households is compo-
sed of three members, but the sample included households
up to 10 members. By analyzing the composition by socio-
economic strata, stratum 4 households have the highest par-
ticipation in the sample with 67%, while strata 5 and 6 have
a share of 22% and 11%, respectively.
The most educated person in the household, not necessa-
rily the head of the household, has an undergraduate degree,
representing 40%, followed by households with a graduate
degree with 28% and then households with a vocational edu-
cation (15%). Households were also categorized by the al-
titude in which they were located, for the reasons described
previously. It is shown that 40% of the households live in ci-
ties with an altitude above sea level of less than 1,000 meters.
They are followed by households living in cities with an alti-
tude between 1,000 and 2,000 meters above sea level, whose
participation in the sample corresponds to 30%. Finally, the
variables associated with aggregate expenditure, expenditure
on utilities, and household income are described.
Table 3 also has expenditure on each utility. The first part
is the total utilities, on average, total expenditure on services
is 76.8 USD per month, showing a significant dispersion of
57.7 USD. The variable expenditure on utilities, that is, ex-
penditure after deduction of the fixed charge, represents the
largest share of total expenditure on utilities. It can be seen
that the service for which households pay the most is elec-
tricity. The average total household income is USD 2,055
per month, which takes into account capital income as oppo-
sed to current income. The average total expenditure is USD
1,569. It is worth noting the high dispersion that exists in to-
tal income and expenditure. Table 17 in the Appendix shows
previous information by strata. There, we can see a high he-
terogeneity among strata.
TABLE 3: DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age Head of household 55.02 15.92 17 99
*Gender Head of household 0.59 0.41 0 1
Members 2.83 1.39 1 10
Stratum (Dummy Variable)
Stratum 4 0.67 0.47 0 1
Stratum 5 0.22 0.42 0 1
Stratum 6 0.11 0.31 0 1
Education (Dummy Variable)
Elementary school 0.05 0.22 0 1
High School 0.15 0.36 0 1
Vocational 0.12 0.33 0 1
Undergraduate 0.40 0.49 0 1
Postgraduate 0.28 0.45 0 1
Altitude
Below 1,000 m.a.s.l 0.44 0.5 0 1
Between 1,000 and 2,000 m.a.s.l 0.31 0.46 0 1
More than 2,000 m.a.s.l 0.25 0.43 0 1
Expenditure statitistics (USD)
Total expenditure in utilities 76.83 57.7 0.85 1027.16
Variable Expenditure in utilities 72.16 57.3 0.85 1,022.21
Expenditure in electricity 41.06 41.95 0 564.05
Expenditure in water 19.61 25.34 0 1,006.13
Expenditure in sewerage 3.94 6.74 0 115.77
Expenditure in gas 7.54 8.30 0 162.4
Fixed Cost 5.7 2.08 2.86 17.09
Fixed cost water 2.96 1.33 1.12 9.82
Fixed cost sewerage 1.79 0.81 0.48 5.77
Fixed cost gas 0.95 0.26 0.34 1.67
Total Income 2,055 2,297.29 0 50,483.64
Current income 1,709.03 1,958.29 0 43,278.74
Total Expenditure 1,569.95 1,842.7 98.87 62,399.57
Current Expenditure 1,110.18 1,125.18 24.54 50,915.87
*Gender=1 if is a Male
To check the unconditional difference between strata re-
garding utilities consumption patterns, Table 4 shows avera-
ge difference tests for the three strata, comparing both the
consumption shares in each of the services and the prices per
unit. Statistically significant differences are observed except
for gas consumption. The difference is generally statistically
significant at 0.01.
TABLE 4: T-TEST SHARES AND PRICES
Variable Diff t statistics




Natural Gas -0.0065 (-1.84)
Electricity(USD/kWh) -0.0252*** (-66.06)
Water(USD/m3 ) -0.3210*** (-58.72)
Sewerage(USD/m3) -0.3130*** (-57.85)
Natural Gas(USD/m3) -0.1030*** (-27.51)
N 5,194




Natural Gas -0.0011 (-0.24)
Electricity(USD/kWh) -0.0161*** (-32.17)
Water(USD/m3 ) -0.4750*** (-71.43)
Sewerage(USD/m3) -0.3930*** (-57.97)
Natural Gas(USD/m3) -0.1050*** (-20.68)
N 4,542




Natural Gas 0.0054 (1.01)
Electricity(USD/kWh) 0.0090*** (14.53)
Water(USD/m3 ) -0.1550*** (-14.50)
Sewerage(USD/m3) -0.0798*** (-7.38)
Natural Gas(USD/m3) -0.0016 (-0.36)
N 1,940
Ho: diff=0
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
It is observed that in stratum 4, the participation of elec-
tricity expenditure is greater than in stratum 5, while for ot-
her services it is higher in stratum 5. In terms of unit prices,
stratum 5 faces higher prices in all utilities compared to stra-
tum 4. When comparing stratum 4 with stratum 6, the same
pattern is observed as in the previous group. However, the
magnitude of the differences in prices is more considerable,
except for electricity, while the difference in shares is less.
Finally, when comparing households in strata 5 and 6, the
participation of water, gas and sewerage services is statis-
tically greater in stratum 5 than in stratum 6; however, the
opposite is true for the share of electricity. In turn, unit prices
are higher in stratum 6, except for electricity.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the shares asso-
ciated with each utility and the logarithm of expenditure, the
left column is an approximation of the Engel curve using
a Kernel estimator. A substantial heterogeneity can be ob-
served for all services, particularly for electricity and water
9
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services where households with a higher expenditure show
a higher consumption of these two services, reinforcing the
idea that both goods are normal, and given the characteristics
of these goods as a basic need for households. The right co-
lumn shows the rate of change associated with each service.
From this figure, it seems that Engel curves are non-linear,
and exhibits polynomial orders greater than 2.
TABLE 5: T-TEST TEST SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES
Variable Diff t statistics
Stratum 4 - 5
Age H.h -2.53*** (-4.97)
Members 0.19*** (4.41)
Total utilities expenditure -18.56*** (-12.63)
Variable expenditure in utilities -16.37*** (-11.17)
Expenditure in electricity -1.91 (-1.70)
Expenditure in water -10.01*** (-15.88)
Expenditure in sewerage -2.39*** (-13.13)
Expenditure in gas -2.05*** (-8.27)
Fixed Cost -2.62*** (-55.81)
Fixed cost water -1.45*** (-42.73)
Fixed cost sewerage -0.97*** (-50.84)
Fixed cost gas -0.20*** (-28.24)
Total Income -834.40*** (-12.99)
Current income -686.3*** (-12.65)
Total Expenditure -735.5*** (-13.34)
Current Expenditure -486.1*** (-14.50)
N 5,194
Stratum 4 - 6
Age H.h -4.36*** (-6.53)
Members 0.15** (2.60)
Total utilities expenditure -60.15*** (-25.88)
Variable expenditure in utilities -57.33*** (-24.71)
Expenditure in electricity -31.13*** (-17.90)
Expenditure in water -17.71*** (-17.44)
Expenditure in sewerage -3.26*** (-12.57)
Expenditure in gas -5.23*** (-15.74)
Fixed Cost -3.59*** (-61.80)
Fixed cost water -1.88*** (-46.32)
Fixed cost sewerage -1.40*** (-57.50)
Fixed cost gas -0.31*** (-32.38)
Total Income -2,067.3*** (-23.09)
Current income -1,685.5*** (-21.26)
Total Expenditure -1,363.9*** (-22.97)
Current Expenditure -843.9*** (-23.96)
N 4,542
Stratum 5 - 6
Age H.h -1.829* (-2.38)
Members -0.0416 (-0.65)
Total utilities expenditure -41.59*** (-11.88)
Variable expenditure in utilities -40.96*** (-11.71)
Expenditure in electricity -29.22*** (-11.40)
Expenditure in water -7.69*** (-4.50)
Expenditure in sewerage -0.86 (-1.88)
Expenditure in gas -3.18*** (-6.80)
Fixed Cost -0.97*** (-10.21)
Fixed cost water -0.44*** (-6.19)
Fixed cost sewerage -0.43*** (-12.44)
Fixed cost gas -0.10*** (-9.65)
Total Income -1,232.9*** (-9.09)
Current income -999.2*** (-8.87)
Total Expenditure -628.4*** (-5.07)
Current Expenditure -357.8*** (-4.65)
N 1,940
Ho: diff=0
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
TABLE 6: χ2 TEST DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Variable χ2 Pr df
Gender H.h 8.54 0.014 2
Education 190.05 0.0000 8
N 5,838
Ho: equal proportions
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table 5 shows mean difference tests by stratum for socio-
economic variables. Significant differences are found for all
combinations of variables by stratum, except for expenditure
on electricity for stratum 4 - 5 and expenditure on sewera-
ge for stratum 5 - 6. So, it seems that there are remarkable
statistically significant differences between households.
Table 6 performs a joint chi-square test for the demograp-
hic variables that are categories showing that there are statis-
tically significant differences. This reflects the joint differen-
ce that exists both by level of education and by gender.
5.3. Estimation results
Table 7, and Figure 8, summarizes the information for the
representative household, which is based on descriptive sta-
tistics in previous section. The representative household has
3 members, living in stratum 4, household head is a 55 years-
old male, the highest education level at household is under-
graduate, and it is located at an altitude less than 1,000 m.a.s.l
Figure 8 displays own-price and cross-price semielastici-
ties. Observe that four out of ten are significant at 5% le-
vel, electricity has three of them. The own-price semielasti-
city of demand for the representative household was 0.10 for
electricity, 0.06 for the water, and 0.01 for gas. The coeffi-
cients associated with the semielasticities of electricity and
water are statistically significant. The above implies that an
electricity price increase of 10 per cent would be associated
with a budget share 1 percentage points higher in this utility
compensating by expenditure effects. Some cross-price ef-
fects are statistically significant, which may reveal presence
of some substitution effect. As an illustration, the electricity
budget share compensated water cross-price semi-elasticity
is -0.079, implying that an increase in the price of the water
is associated with a statistically significant decrease in the
budget share for electricity. While these two services are of
primary importance to households, they tend to offset. The
rightmost block of Table 7 gives compensated price semi-
elasticities mentioned above.
The S matrix, normalizes the Slutsky matrix for prices and
expenditure, and is related to the compensated semi-elasticity
matrix, by S= Γ + ww'- W, where Γ is 3, and W = diag(w).
The values of the own-price Slutsky terms are reported in
the second column of Table 7. Concavity of expenditure fun-
ction is satisfied if and only if S is negative semi-definite
(see Pollak and Wales, 1995). A glance at this column re-
veals that own-price Slutsky terms are all negative, and sta-
tistically significant, showing normal goods. The S matrix
is negative semi-definite, implying that the expenditure fun-
ction is weakly concave at this point in the data.
The leftmost column of Table 7 contains estimated own-
price elements of B, which show the magnitudes of the inter-
action between own-prices and total expenditures in utilities.
11
































































































































































































































































































Slutstky element Electricity Water Gas
Electricity 0.0545** -0.2499*** 0.1054***
(0.0176) (0.0187) (0.0187)
Water 0.0277 -0.1786*** -0.0792*** 0.0605***
(0.0163) (0.0168) (0.0143) (0.0168)
Gas -0.0033 -0.1275*** -0.0238* -0.0005 0.0179
(0.0107) (0.0125) (0.0102) (0.0088) (0.0125)
Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001




Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
TABLE 9: COMPENSATED SEMIELASTICITIES RESPECT TO DEMOGRAPHICS VARIABLES









Electricity 0.0029 0.0078*** -0.0038 -0.0206* 0.0127 -0.0266 -0.0326** -0.0332** -0.0144 -0.202***
(0.0027) (0.0002) (0.0074) (0.0098) (0.0142) (0.0198) (0.0115) (0.0127) (0.0083) (0.0085)
Water -0.0207*** -0.0091*** 0.0008 0.0095 -0.0397** 0.0085 0.0063 0.0014 -0.017 0.1479***
(0.0028) (0.0002) (0.0077) (0.0096) (0.0144) (0.0201) (0.0116) (0.0129) (0.0086) (0.009)
Gas 0.0038* -0.0032*** -0.0042 -0.0054 0.0157*** 0.0201 0.0214** 0.0184* 0.0285*** 0.0217***
(0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0048) (0.0063) (0.0092) (0.0125) (0.0073) (0.0081) (0.0055) (0.0056)
Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
These parameters allow to assess whether or not compen-
sated semi-elasticities are the same for high and low spen-
ding households. Electricity own-price compensated semi-
elasticity coefficient estimate on y is 0.054 and it is statis-
tically significant. We compare electricity own-price com-
pensated semi-elasticity for a representative household at the
10th percentile of expenditure (x = -1.098) versus a hou-
sehold at the 85th percentile of expenditure (x = 0.28). Re-
12
member that electricity own-price semielasticity at the me-
dian expenditure (x = 0) is 0,105. Based on the Slutsky equa-
tion, we use expenditure and semielasticity values in B to
make a comparison. At the 10th percentile, we have - 0.105
- 1.098 *0.054 = -0.164, in contrast, at the 85th percentile
- 0.105 + 0.28 *0.054 = -0.089. Also, corresponding own-
price electricity terms in S are -0.068 at the 10th percentile,
and -0.052 at the 85th percentile, both are statistically signifi-
cant negative; however, the magnitude of the results is simi-
lar. These results suggest a slight difference in substitution
effects of households for different amounts of expenditure,
that is, households with lower expenditure levels substitute a
few more than households with higher levels in the face of an
increase in electricity price. Similar degree of substitutability
between households may be due electricity is a normal good
that has no close substitutes.
Table 8 shows real expenditure semielasticities where
electricity and gas semielasticities are statistically signifi-
cant. This tells that a real expenditure increase of 10 per cent
would be associated with a budget share of 0.70 percentage
points higher for electricity. This can be associated with the
fact that expenditure increases in utilities at these socioeco-
nomic levels are more associated with electricity, for instan-
ce, more use of electric appliances, than water and gas.
Demographic semielasticities are shown in Table 9 and in-
tended to capture observable preferences related to demand.
For electricity, household head age, the altitude of the mu-
nicipality, highest education level at household, and belong
to stratum 5 are statistically significant for the representati-
ve household. For instance, municipalities at higher altitu-
des above sea level proportionally expend less in electricity
than municipalities at less altitude. Variations in water shares
are statistically associated with household size, and altitude.
Gas is statistically associated with household size, household
head age, education level, and altitude.
The exercise was also performed for a household with ot-
her characteristics. For this purpose, the representative hou-
sehold for each stratum was taken. For those living in stratum
4, the representative household has three members, the head
of the household is a 54 year-old male, the highest educa-
tional degree at household is undergraduate, and it is located
at an altitude of less than 1,000 m.a.s.l. For those who live
in stratum 5, the representative household has two members,
the head of the household is a 56 years-old male, the maxi-
mum education level is undergraduate, and the dwelling is
located at an altitude higher than 1,000 m.a.s.l. Finally, the
representative household of stratum 6 has three members, is
at an altitude higher than 1,000 m.a.s.l., the head of the hou-
sehold is a 60 year-old male, and the highest education level
is postgraduate.
Figure 9 shows coefficient estimates for these representati-
ve households. This figure allows to see a high heterogeneity.
Tables 19 - 27 in Appendix have coefficients estimates and
standard errors.
We get two main conclusions from studying price effects.
First, elasticity estimates reflect a high level of heterogeneity
between representative households for different socioecono-
mic strata. Second, substitution effects do not differ much
when we carry out analysis for different percentiles of the
real expenditure once controling for strata.
Tables 10 and 11 show Marshallian expenditure elastici-
ties. These are categorized by stratum, and by quartiles of
household total expenditure and total income. In general, it
can be seen that all three goods are normal. It is observed
that for electricity, the values oscillate between 0.91 and 1.
So for every 1% increase in utility expenditure, electricity
demand increases between 0.91% and 1%. Although these
results confirm that electricity is a basic necessity, it is belie-
ved that the results with high values are due to the segment
of households analyzed, since high-income households ha-
ve access to more and different goods that are intensive in
electricity consumption.
Water expenditure elasticities greater than one are obser-
ved, this does not indicate that for households, water is a lu-
xury good because it has elasticities greater than one, since
the relationship is not with income increase. What this indi-
cates is that as utility expenditure increases, expenditure on
water consumption increases more than proportionally. This
makes sense if we frame it in the SPPD report that shows
that strata 4, 5, and 6 are those with the highest water con-
sumption, up to 50% more than the lower strata.
Natural expenditure elasticity is the smallest, it is positive,
but less than 1, reflecting that it is a necessary good. 10%
increase in utility expenditure implies gas increases between
4.9% and 8.2%. Tables 12 and 13 show Marshallian price
elasticities results. Negative expected signs are observed for
all utilities.
Analyzing information by quartiles, price elasticity is bet-
ween -0.72 and -0.64. This means inelastic demand for strata
4, 5, and 6. It is observed that at lower utility expenditure,
households are less sensitive to changes in prices controlling
for strata.
Water is the most inelastic of the three public services, this
is due to lacking substitutes. Elasticity tends to be similar
when moving between quartiles ranging between -0.55 and
-0.36.
Natural gas results indicate price elasticity between -0.72
and -0.67, showing that this service is inelastic. In Colombia,
most of the gas use is cooking with not near substitute at least
buying an electricity device.
Electricity results are in line with those obtained for other
countries by authors such as Baker et al. (1989); Blundell and
Robin (1999); Labandeira et al. (2006); Lavín et al. (2011);
Krishnamurthy and Kriström (2015); Galvez et al. (2016),
additionally with Reaños and Wölfing (2018) who use the
EASI model methodology.
When we compare the results for Colombia, we see that
the results of electricity price elasticity are higher in absolute
value than those found by Cano et al. (2011). They estima-
te an elasticity for the category where electricity is found of
-0.37. Ramírez and Londoño (2008), perform a disaggrega-
ted analysis at the stratum level, finding for strata 4, 5, and
6, long-term price elasticities of -0.96 -1.05 -0.78 and short-
term of up to -0.66, -0.82, -0.66 respectively for each stra-
tum, respectively. Maddock et al. (1992), for the strata 3-4 of
-0.50 and 5-6 of -0.79, both papers are consistent with the re-
sults obtained here. Previous literature also reports results of
the income or expenditure elasticity of electricity, when com-
pared with ours, the results are higher than those previously
reported. When analyzing the rest of the public services, a
work for Colombia that integrates two of these, water and
13













































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 10: UNCOMPENSATED EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES
Category Electricity Water Gas
Complete 0.9791 1.3339 0.6441
Stratum 4 1.0021 1.2710 0.6995
Stratum 5 0.9112 1.5238 0.4946
Stratum 6 0.9782 1.3280 0.6156
TABLE 11: UNCOMPENSATED EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES BY QUARTILES










1st Quartile 0.9473 0.9500 0.9541 0.9587
2nd Quartile 0.9790 0.9774 0.9754 0.9676
3rd Quartile 0.9890 0.9895 1.0019 0.9954
4th Quartile 1.0011 0.9996 0.9850 0.9948
Water
1st Quartile 1.3966 1.4052 1.4183 1.3972
2nd Quartile 1.3568 1.3281 1.3073 1.3285
3rd Quartile 1.3004 1.3131 1.2716 1.2839
4th Quartile 1.2818 1.2891 1.3383 1.3259
Gas
1st Quartile 0.7926 0.7625 0.8201 0.7715
2nd Quartile 0.7147 0.7122 0.6441 0.6808
3rd Quartile 0.5670 0.5889 0.5644 0.5456
4th Quartile 0.5019 0.5127 0.5478 0.5784
14
TABLE 12: UNCOMPENSATED OWN PRICE ELASTICITIES
Category Electricity Water Gas
Complete -0.7029 -0.4550 -0.7033
Stratum 4 -0.7295 -0.4138 -0.7103
Stratum 5 -0.6494 -0.5575 -0.6733
Stratum 6 -0.6555 -0.4917 -0.7203
TABLE 13: UNCOMPENSATED OWN PRICE ELASTICITY BY QUARTILES










1st Quartile -0.6844 -0.6860 -0.7011 -0.7041
2nd Quartile -0.7024 -0.7073 -0.7039 -0.7058
3rd Quartile -0.7199 -0.7154 -0.7201 -0.7095
4th Quartile -0.7051 -0.7031 -0.6867 -0.6923
Water
1st Quartile -0.4013 -0.4085 -0.4157 -0.3691
2nd Quartile -0.4300 -0.4093 -0.4135 -0.4577
3rd Quartile -0.4951 -0.4968 -0.4800 -0.4694
4th Quartile -0.4935 -0.5052 -0.5107 -0.5237
Gas
1st Quartile -0.7301 -0.7101 -0.7132 -0.7121
2nd Quartile -0.7117 -0.7205 -0.7116 -0.7076
3rd Quartile -0.6782 -0.6866 -0.7053 -0.6955
4th Quartile -0.6929 -0.6958 -0.6829 -0.6978
electricity, is that of Medina and Morales (2007) who finds a
price elasticity for electricity of -0.45, and the price elasticity
of water demand is -0.23, both results show less elastic than
those found in here. Since not much evidence is found for
Colombia on the elasticity of goods such as gas and water,
the results are compared with other countries. A generality
is that given the condition of necessary good, and without a
close water substitute, this good tends to be inelastic. Florax
et al. (2003) carried out a meta-analysis of price and income
elasticities of residential water demand covering the period
from 1963 to 1998 in which they analyzed studies for diffe-
rent countries, under different methodologies, and found that
distribution of income elasticities has a mean of 0.43 and pri-
ce elasticity of -0.41.
Other authors such as Martinez-Espineira (2004) find a
short-term price elasticity equal to -0.10 for Spain and -0.50
in the long term, while the Galvez et al. (2016) find a price
elasticity of -0.75 for the same country. Ruijs et al. (2008) for
Brazil between -0.46 and -0.50 and Schleich and Hillenbrand
(2009) for Germany between -0.24 and -0.75. With the abo-
ve, the results found in this work are similar to the evidence
found in the literature for other countries.
Finally, for natural gas, Blundell and Robin (1999) use a
QUAIDS, finding price elasticities up to -0.42 and income
elasticities between 0.58 and 0.74 depending on the quartile
evaluated. Labandeira et al. (2016), under a meta-analysis,
show short-term price elasticity results for the European
Union between -0.92 and 0.28, a fairly wide range, and cal-
culate an average elasticity of -0.26. Burke and Yang (2016)
used national-level data for a sample of 44 countries to esti-
mate the price and income elasticities. They present separate
estimates for final natural gas demand by households obtain
estimates between -0.13 and -1.44 according to specification.
The income elasticity point estimates are between 0.58 and
greater than 1. Finally, for Colombia, UPME considers diffe-
rent moments and measures established by the government,
finding differences in price elasticity of households that os-
cillate in absolute value between 0.3 and 1.8 between 2015
and 2017.
In general, it is observed that reported results of price elas-
ticities are in the ranges shown by the literature for different
countries, and for Colombia, the main differences are in ex-
penditure or income elasticities.
We show conditional Engel curves in Figure 10. These cur-
ves are only for the representative household, that is, a hou-
sehold with three members, household head is a 55 year-old
male with a professional education level, the household is lo-
cated in a city with an altitude lower than 1,000 m.a.s.l, and
the socioeconomic stratum is 4. So, at these base prices we
obtain the Engel curve given by w = ∑5r=0 brxr +Cz+Dzx+
ε , where Cz and Dzx capture interaction given by differences
between demographic characteristics and y. For the repre-
sentative household w = ∑5r=0 brxr, we assume unobserved
heterogeneity ε = 0. Baseline period Engel curves for hou-
seholds with different values of unobserved heterogeneity are
identical except for being vertically shifted by e. Results are
reported to take the median into quartiles, and the curves are
plotted using a local smoothing regression (blue) and spline
smooth (black).
It is observed that all three sets of estimates lie within the
pointwise confidence intervals of the exact model estimates,
Engel curves for the representative household present appa-
15
rent curvatures for all public utilities. The above is supported
by the statistical significance of different polynomial terms
in the electricity, water and gas equations. It can be seen that
the Engel curve has a positive slope, for water and electricity,
given that they are normal goods, as shown in the previous
analysis, and all have a positive elasticity with respect to va-
riable expenditure on utilities. Natural gas is a service that
presents a decreasing part of the expenditure as it increases.
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Predicted electricity and water expenditure monotonically
increase with variable expenditure, as shown by the analysis
of the expenditure elasticities by quartiles for these services.
Electricity Engel curve has a steeper slope than water. For
this last service, we can see a tendency to increase in expen-
diture that stabilizes at the highest segments finding evidence
of an inverse U-shaped mild relationship. Although natural
gas increases when expenditure increases, it is shown that
there is a large decrease in their budget weight as we move to
higher deciles. Everything else constant, expenditure on elec-
tricity, water and natural gas tend to represent in households
at the lower decile 52, 20 and 15 per cent of their budgets,
respectively.
This is relevant because Engel curves shapes enable more
informed decisions to be made to minimize welfare losses
associated with price increases. In particular, although it is
not the object of study of this paper, it is of special analysis
in the structure of subsidies and contributions that are given
to households of low strata.
5.4. Welfare Analysis
We perform welfare analysis based on the equivalent va-
riation from our sample. Equivalent variation tells how much
money should be taken from the household at the original
price to have an equivalent effect on his/her welfare as the
price rise. We use the equation 12. However, we do not know
w1i ; this value is calculated using the definition of elasticity
obtaining w1i = w0 ∗ (1+ εw∆%P), where εw is the Marsha-
llian price elasticity respect to the share, which is calculated
using equation 8, and ∆%P is the percentual change in pri-
ces, prices are in levels.
The equivalent variation is different for each household
since while households from the same stratum located in the
same municipality have the same prices, they generally ex-
perience differences in x, w1, and w0. Households that have
a higher expenditure experience a more significant equiva-
lent variation, so money that should be withdrawn to these
households at the original price is higher. To avoid distor-
tions, we omit households that have shares equal to zero; so,
the sample becomes 4,404. Table 14 shows descriptive infor-
mation of the calculation of the equivalent variation (mean,
standard deviation, minimum and maximum) by strata, and
as a proportion of other variables.
Equivalent variation is 0.77 dollars on average, and it is
increasing with strata. When the information is analyzed as
a proportion of expenses on utilities and total household ex-
penses, the highest is associated with stratum 4. Figure 11
shows scatter plots regarding these figures. We observe a
high level of heterogeneity with expenditures displaying in-
creasing order according to strata.
TABLE 14: EQUIVALENT VARIATION
Mean Std. Desv Min Max
EV (¢)
Complete $77.55 $62.29 $2.91 $1456.60
Stratum 4 $68.47 $46.43 $2.91 $799.06
Stratum 5 $79.78 $57.23 $9.19 $632.43
Stratum 6 $123.72 $109.48 $14.35 $1456.60
EV /TU (%)
Complete 0.94% 0.20% 0.17% 4.59%
Stratum 4 0.97% 0.19% 0.17% 4.59%
Stratum 5 0.88% 0.21% 0.25% 3.95%
Stratum 6 0.95% 0.17% 0.49% 1.84%
EV /TE (%)
Complete 0.06% 0.05% 0% 0.54%
Stratum 4 0.07% 0.05% 0% 0.54%
Stratum 5 0.05% 0.04% 0% 0.39%
Stratum 6 0.06% 0.04% 0% 0.24%
EV: Equivalent Variation, TU: Total Utilities, TE: Total expenditure
16
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FIG. 12: EV, EXPENDITURE AND ∆ PRICES
Figure 12 shows a perspective that allows us to relate: the
equivalent variation, the change in price, and the expenditure
for each of the households. The top panel will enable us to
illustrate the global effect on the distribution of these hou-
seholds, showing that the equivalent variation is increasing
for the expenditure. We observe that there are households in
stratum 4 experiencing similar or greater variation than those
in higher strata.
The bottom panel is a lowess approximation represented
by the plan, where the points are the households. An increa-
sing trend is observed as the level of expenditure increases.
It reinforces the idea that changes in price may represent a
different equivalent variation because average prices per stra-
tum are different even for the same level of expenditure.
5.5. Alternative Scenario
Now we present some exercises where we try to obtain dif-
ferential taxation rules by stratum such that tax income under
the base scenario is achieved but minimizing social welfare
losses. However, we should take into account that the con-
cept of social welfare is dubious, given the Arrow’s impos-
sibility theorem (Arrow, 1950). The main issue here is how
to weight individual equivalent variations. Despite this war-
ning, we try to propose some “sensible” alternative scenarios
under progressive tax rules.
Table 15 shows the information required to perform these
alternative scenarios. The initial quantities (Q0) and the num-
ber of subscribers are taken from the SUI in June 2019. The
new quantities (Q1) are calculated using elasticity definition,
the relationship Q1 = Q0 ∗(1+εm∆%P), where εm is the de-
mand Marshallian price elasticity (Table 13). Table 15 also
shows the target population; urban and regulated households
belonging to strata 4, 5, and 6. The final quantities Q1, the
value of the tax, and the number of users allow an estimate
of how much will be collected monthly. The SSPD estima-
ted to collect per household between $ 0.27 ($800 COP) and
$ 0.43 ($1,300 COP) monthly according to stratum. Assu-
ming that the number of subscribers remains constant, $15.4
billion will be collected over the 42 months of the tax.
TABLE 15: USERS AND COLLECT MONTHLY
Q0 Q1 Users Collect(Thousand $)
Complete 1,600,323 367.54
Stratum 4 164.04 163.13 999,654 195.69
Stratum 5 199.09 198.24 380,812 90.59
Stratum 6 309.40 308.02 219,857 81.26
The representative household for each stratum is construc-
ted based on the description in Session 5 and the descriptive
statistics taking the median. Representative agents are chosen
because taxes are charged by stratum and not by households.
The base scenario has an even price increase equal to USD
0.0012, which implies an average percentage change in the
prices equal to 0.76%, 0.65%, and 0.68% for stratum 4, 5,
and 6, respectively. So, we propose to solve the program 14,
that is, minimize the social loss (sum of total representative
equivalent variations) such that total tax income is same, but
percentage variations are increasing with strata (θ4 < θ5 <



































P1k ∗Q1k ∗Usersk = $369,40
Table 16 shows additional scenarios raised. Since we are
working with representative households, the welfare results
are not comparable with those from Table 11, but we can
compare them to each other. The budget constraint is gua-
ranteed by having the same number of households per stra-
tum and the same total collection, not necessarily the same
collection per stratum.
The left column shows the scenario in which a price in-
crease is made in the way the tax was implemented. The EV
value for each representative household expressed in cents
(¢) is $61.25, $69.47, and $97.17 for stratum 4, 5, and 6. It
is observed that stratum 4 is the one that presents the highest
percentage increase and the highest welfare loss as a percen-
tage of total utility expenses (1.09%). This stratum also re-
presents the main proportion of total tax income ($195.69
thousand, more than 50%, see Table 15).
In the alternative scenario, we propose percentage increa-
ses according to strata, θ4 < θ5 < θ6, but same total tax inco-
me. The result is θ4 = 0,70%, θ5 = 0,71% and θ6 = 0,72%.
It can be seen that these values are lower than the initial value
for θ4 but higher for the other two strata as expected.
As a consequence, the collection is lower in stratum 4 and
higher in the others; the total welfare loss decreases. Decrea-
sing for stratum 4, but increasing for strata 5 and 6. When
analyzing the EV/TU ratio, a reduction in this proportion is
observed for stratum 4 such that household welfare losses as
total utility expenses percentage are very similar among stra-
ta. It seems that our alternative scenario establishes a better
“social situation” under a progressive tax rule.
Although the collection of the tax implies a reduction in
the welfare of households in strata 4, 5 and 6, there is the be-
nefit that users served by Electricaribe, in the vast majority of
strata 1, 2 and 3, will benefit from a better electricity service
that mitigates problems like interruptions, rationing, among
others2. Frequent electricity interruptions and rationing force
users to consume less than the optimal amount according to
their preferences and established tariffs. In goods such as pu-
blic services, particularly electricity, welfare losses depend
not only on the amount of energy not consumed during the
2UPME (2015) shows that interruption costs in the residential sector vary
by stratum and hour and that on average households willingness to pay to
avoid a one-hour cut on weekdays is USD 0.11.
supply cut but also on the moment when the service is in-
terrupted due to the peak-load demand. Given the difficulty
of the user to cover himself against this risk, minimizing the
option of welfare losses in users is essential.
TABLE 16: ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO
Baseline Alternative
Complete Total EV ($)* 1,090.46 1,086.66
∆T EV -3.80
collection ($)* 367.54 367.54
Stratum 4 θ4(%) 0.76 0.70
Prices (¢) 15.94 15.93
∆P -0.01
EV by Household (¢) 61.25 57.90
Total EV ($)* 612.28 578.83
∆T EV -33.42
EV/TU (%) 1.09 1.03
collection ($)* 196.78 181.80
Stratum 5 θ5 (%) 0.65 0.71
Prices (¢) 18.59 18.60
∆P 0.01
EV by Household (¢) 69.47 74.51
Total EV ($)* 264.54 283.75
∆T EV 19.21
EV/TU (%) 0.98 1.05
collection ($)* 90.98 99.38
Stratum 6 θ6 (%) 0.68 0.72
Prices 17.74 17.75
∆P 0.01
EV by Household (¢) 97.17 101.90
Total EV ($)* 213.64 224.04
∆T EV 10.4
EV/TU (%) 1.00 1.05
collection ($)* 81.63 86.36
*In thoushands
6. CONCLUSIONS
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to have em-
pirically examined an EASI model for Colombia, making an
application to the retail market households of strata 4, 5, and
6. The results are broadly in line with previous empirical stu-
dies both for Colombia and for other countries confirming
that goods such as electricity, water, and gas are inelastic
goods, that is, these are considered necessary goods regard-
less of the stratum being analyzed. Although, we show that in
this application Engel curves are polynomials of degree hig-
her than 2; therefore, the EASI model is a necessary choice.
The analysis of taxes on public services, such as electri-
city, requires accurate and precise price effects estimates. So,
using micro-level data avoids biases due to aggregation and
allows to find heterogeneous responses of consumers to pri-
ce changes according to their characteristics and expenditure
levels, among other things. In particular, Ex ante tax analy-
sis is critical to infer welfare implications. We show through
a simple optimization program based on reliable estimates
that “better social” solutions can be achieved. The econo-
mic intuition is basic: discriminate consumers according to a
progressive tax rule on consumption. Our empirical exercise
shows that it is possible to reduce welfare losses by keeping
the same tax incomes, that is, keeping the same welfare gains
for beneficiaries of the tax collection.
Future research should analyze welfare gains associated
with avoiding power outage or/and poor quality service. This
is particularly relevant as welfare losses are approximately
18
three times tax collections. So, welfare gains using tax in-
come should compensate welfare losses. In our application,
it is well known that electricity quality service provided by
Electricaribe has caused damage to electric devices affecting
the most social vulnerable population. So, it would be inter-
esting to obtain the welfare social balance between welfa-
re gains improving electricity quality service versus welfare
losses due to broad national taxes.
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TABLE 17: DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS BY STRATUM
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Stratum 4 3,898
Age H.h 54.01 15.78 17 97
Gender H.h 0.58 0.49 0 1
Members 2.89 1.43 1 10
Education
Elementary school 0.06 0.24 0 1
High School 0.17 0.38 0 1
Associate Degree 0.14 0.35 0 1
Undergraduate 0.38 0.49 0 1
Postgraduate 0.24 0.43 0 1
Altitude
Below 1,000 m.a.s.l 0.48 0.5 0 1
Between 1,000 and 2,000 m.a.s.l 0.26 0.44 0 1
More than 2,000 m.a.s.l 0.26 0.44 0 1
Expenditure statitistics (USD)
Total expenditure in utilities 66.07 42.75 0.85 527.06
Variable expenditure in services 62.2 42.61 0.85 524.25
Expenditure in electricity 37.2 33.03 0 494.27
Expenditure in water 15.44 16.62 0 262.01
Expenditure in sewerage 3.05 4.55 0 57.38
Expenditure in gas 6.51 7.21 0 126.18
Fixed cost 4.72 1.24 2.86 9.54
Fixed cost water 2.43 0.86 1.12 4.77
Fixed cost sewerage 1.42 0.55 0.48 4.33
Fixed cost gas 0.87 0.23 0.34 1.39
Total income 1,641.73 1,812.99 0 43,415.44
Current income 1,370.74 1,603.77 0 43,278.74
Total expenditure 1,256.22 1,208.71 98.87 27,951.5
Current expenditure 909.17 703.29 24.54 13,101.27
Stratum 5 1,296
Age H.h 56.55 16.29 18 99
Gender H.h 0.58 0.49 0 1
Members 2.7 1.31 1 8
Education
Elementary school 0.04 0.19 0 1
High School 0.11 0.32 0 1
Associate Degree 0.09 0.28 0 1
Undergraduate 0.43 0.49 0 1
Postgraduate 0.33 0.47 0 1
Altitude
Below 1,000 m.a.s.l 0.3 0.46 0 1
Between 1,000 and 2,000 m.a.s.l 0.48 0.5 0 1
More than 2,000 m.a.s.l 0.22 0.41 0 1
Expenditure statitistics (USD)
Total expenditure in utilities 84.63 54 2.79 517.12
Variable expenditure in services 78.57 53.96 1.87 511.07
Expenditure in electricity 39.11 40.72 0 409.87
Expenditure in water 25.45 26.81 0 244.86
Expenditure in sewerage 5.45 8.21 0 74.71
Expenditure in gas 8.56 9.13 0 162.4
Fixed cost 7.34 1.99 4.5 13.26
Fixed cost water 3.88 1.49 1.99 8.57
Fixed cost sewerage 2.39 0.72 1.12 5.34
Fixed cost gas 1.07 0.23 0.41 1.67
Total income 2476.12 2490.68 0 50483.64
Current income 2057.06 1934.45 0 23157.89
Total expenditure 1991.72 2729.49 180.88 62399.57
Current expenditure 1395.28 1701.44 82.14 50915.87
Stratum 6 644
Age H.h 58.38 15.21 20 97
Gender H.h 0.64 0.48 0 1
Members 2.74 1.33 1 8
Education
Elementary school 0.03 0.16 0 1
High School 0.1 0.30 0 1
Associate Degree 0.05 0.23 0 1
Undergraduate 0.41 0.49 0 1
Postgraduate 0.41 0.49 0 1
Altitude
Below 1,000 m.a.s.l 0.47 0.5 0 1
Between 1,000 and 2,000 m.a.s.l 0.27 0.44 0 1
More than 2,000 m.a.s.l 0.26 0.44 0 1
Expenditure statitistics (USD)
Total expenditure in utilities 126.22 100.04 12.91 1027.16
Total expenditure in services 119.53 100.03 6.58 1022.21
Expenditure in electricity 68.33 71.97 0 564.05
Expenditure in water 33.15 48.48 0 1006.13
Expenditure in sewerage 6.31 11.68 0 115.77
Expenditure in gas 11.74 10.76 0 106.26
Fixed cost 8.31 1.96 4.61 17.09
Fixed cost water 4.31 1.39 2.05 9.82
Fixed cost sewerage 2.82 0.71 1.16 5.77
Fixed cost gas 1.18 0.23 0.58 1.5
Total Income 3709 3370.54 0 29297.36
Current income 3056.26 2988.55 0 27970.19
Total Expenditure 2620.11 2214.77 136.7 26177.15
Current Expenditure 1753.08 1357.22 119.6 10446.89
TABLE 18: SUMMARY STATISTICS BY STRATUM
















Natural Gas 0.11 0.10
Prices N Min Max
Stratum 4
Electricity(USD/kWh) 0.16 0.01 3,898 0.13 0.20
Water(USD/m3 ) 0.55 0.15 0.16 0.91
Sewerage(USD/m3) 0.46 0.15 0.16 1.05
Natural Gas(USD/m3) 0.47 0.12 0.09 0.87
Stratum 5
Electricity(USD/kWh) 0.19 0.01 1,296 0.16 0.27
Water(USD/m3 ) 0.87 0.23 0.23 1.39
Sewerage(USD/m3) 0.77 0.22 0.24 1.23
Natural Gas(USD/m3) 0.57 0.09 0.23 0.95
Stratum 6
Electricity(USD/kWh) 0.18 0.01 644 0.15 0.22
Water(USD/m3 ) 1.02 0.21 0.25 1.46
Sewerage(USD/m3) 0.85 0.22 0.38 1.31
Natural Gas(USD/m3) 0.57 0.09 0.36 0.85
Prices are converted to dollars using the exchange rate of 30/06/2017, equivalent to 1 USD
=$3,038.26 . Source: Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia
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Slutstky element Electricity Water Gas
Electricity 0.0545** -0.1580*** 0.0874***
(0.0176) (0.0216) (0.0216)
Water -0.0670 -0.1314*** -0.0586*** 0.0517*
(0.0138) (0.0206) (0.0174) (0.0206)
Gas 0.0070 -0.0907*** -0.0251 -0.0063 0.0183
(0.0107) (0.0130) (0.0134) (0.01030) (0.0130)
Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001




Slutstky element Electricity Water Gas
Electricity 0.0545** 0.0476 0.2648***
(0.0176) (0.0273) (0.0273)
Water -0.0670 -0.0596* -0.2279*** 0.1900***
(0.0138) (0.0237) (0.0204) (0.0237)
Gas 0.0070 -0.0642*** -0.053 0.0857*** 0.0397*
(0.0107) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0135) (0.0195)
Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001




Slutstky element Electricity Water Gas
Electricity 0.0545** -0.2330*** 0.0161
(0.0176) (0.0376) (0.0376)
Water -0.0670 -0.0847** -0.0896** 0.1237***
(0.0138) (0.0359) (0.0301) (0.0359)
Gas 0.0070 -0.1372*** 0.0291 0.0455* 0.0098
(0.0107) (0.0291) (0.0263) (0.0193) (0.0291)
Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001




Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001




Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001




Standard error are in parenthesis * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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TABLE 25: DEMOGRAPHIC SEMIELASTICIES: STRATUM 4









Electricity 0.0071* 0.0159*** 0.0051 -0.0160 0.0151 -0.0434* -0.0510*** -0.0451*** -0.0298*** -0.1712***
(0.0029) (0.0002) (0.0074) (0.0099) (0.0162) (0.0185) (0.0110) (0.0123) (0.0087) (0.0086)
Water -0.0263*** -0.0122*** -0.0065 -0.0005 -0.0359* 0.0241 0.0227 0.0127 -0.0049 0.1239***
(0.0029) (0.0002) (0.0073) (0.0092) (0.0150) (0.0184) (0.0109) (0.0122) (0.0086) (0.0087)
Gas 0.0032 -0.0100 -0.0104 -0.0097 -0.0014 0.0004 -0.0070 -0.0168 -0.0047 -0.0131
(0.0023) (0.0002) (0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0119) (0.0144) (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.0067) (0.0066)
Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
TABLE 26: DEMOGRAPHIC SEMIELASTICIES: STRATUM 5









Electricity -0.0506*** -0.0396*** -0.0495*** -0.0753*** -0.0672*** -0.0140 0.0015 0.0109 0.0091 -0.1235***
(0.0039) (0.0003) (0.0099) (0.0122) (0.0140) (0.0265) (0.0154) (0.0175) (0.0111) (0.0117)
Water 0.0238*** 0.0340*** 0.0394*** 0.0567*** 0.0391** 0.0654* 0.0569*** 0.0459** 0.0330** 0.1338***
(0.0040) (0.0003) (0.0103) (0.0122) (0.0143) (0.0274) (0.0156) (0.0181) (0.0115) (0.0121)
Gas 0.0186*** 0.0046*** 0.0036 0.0006 0.0097 -0.0477** -0.0575*** -0.0716*** -0.0550*** -0.0597***
(0.0022) (0.0002) (0.0059) (0.0077) (0.0093) (0.0153) (0.0090) (0.0102) (0.0066) (0.0072)
Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
TABLE 27: DEMOGRAPHIC SEMIELASTICIES: STRATUM 6









Electricity -0.0035 0.0049*** -0.0055 -0.0264** 0.0016 -0.0173 -0.0231* -0.0162 -0.0088 -0.1519***
(0.0029) (0.0002) (0.0073) (0.0097) (0.0199) (0.0187) (0.0110) (0.0124) (0.0085) (0.0083)
Water -0.0199*** -0.0055*** 0.0002 0.0106 -0.0308 0.0111 0.0105 0.0006 -0.0099 0.1109***
(0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0080) (0.0104) (0.0216) (0.0203) (0.0119) (0.0135) (0.0093) (0.0092)
Gas 0.0112*** -0.0021*** -0.0029 -0.0024 0.0147 0.0081 0.0080 -0.0019 0.0122* 0.0027
(0.0016) (0.0001) (0.0041) (0.0054) (0.0111) (0.0104) (0.0061) (0.0069) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Standard error are in parenthesis, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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